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Abstract—A city’s critical infrastructure such as gas, water,
and power systems, are largely interdependent since they share
energy, computing, and communication resources. This, in turn,
makes it challenging to endow them with fool-proof security
solutions. In this paper, a unified model for interdependent gas-
power-water infrastructure is presented and the security of this
model is studied using a novel game-theoretic framework. In par-
ticular, a zero-sum noncooperative game is formulated between a
malicious attacker who seeks to simultaneously alter the states of
the gas-power-water critical infrastructure to increase the power
generation cost and a defender who allocates communication
resources over its attack detection filters in local areas to monitor
the infrastructure. At the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of this
game, numerical results show that the expected power generation
cost deviation is 35% lower than the one resulting from an equal
allocation of resources over the local filters. The results also show
that, at equilibrium, the interdependence of the power system on
the natural gas and water systems can motivate the attacker to
target the states of the water and natural gas systems to change
the operational states of the power grid. Conversely, the defender
allocates a portion of its resources to the water and natural gas
states of the interdependent system to protect the grid from state
deviations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Owing to the integration of information and communication
technologies, critical infrastructure such as electric power
grids, water systems, and natural gas distribution systems will
be largely interdependent [1]–[3]. This critical infrastructure
interdependence is identified in [3] in which the authors de-
scribe the interdependence between the functionality of various
systems such as the water, natural gas, transportation, and
telecommunication networks. Considering these infrastructure
as cyber-physical systems (CPSs) where the physical network
is monitored by an intelligent control layer [4], [5], their
interdependence makes the design of accurate monitors of the
system states challenging.
The security of critical cyber-physical infrastructure in the
face of cyber and physical attacks has received increasing at-
tention, recently. In [6]–[8], several control-theoretic solutions
have been introduced for securing CPSs. In [6], the authors
analyzed the impact of several additive attacks on a linear
state space CPS model. Secure control design for CPSs is
addressed in [7] which presents a resilient state estimation
technique in the presence of attacks on the actuators of the
system. The work in [8] analyzed the impact of cyber attacks
against the state estimators where it was shown that attacks
can be initiated even in presence of strict limitations on the
attackers resources.
This research was supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation under
Grants ACI-1541105, ACI-1541069, and CNS-1446621.
In addition, a number of recent works studied the game-
theoretic security of critical infrastructure such as in [9]–[11].
A Stackelberg game was proposed in [9] to maintain the
performance of a control system despite the presence of attack.
In [10] and [11], the problem of security resource allocation
for CPS is studied using a Colonel Blotto game framework
that yields an optimal allocation of limited defense resources
over the various CPS nodes. However, [9]–[11] do not ac-
count for the interdependence between critical infrastructure
in optimal allocation of defense resources, while [6]–[8] do
not consider the limitations on the resources of the defender
when monitoring the system.
The main contribution of this paper is a novel framework for
analyzing the interdependence between gas, power, and water
critical infrastructure in presence of a malicious adversary.
In particular, we first present a unified model for the inter-
dependent gas-power-water infrastructure. Then we study the
optimal allocation of defense resources over the subsystems
of interdependent power, water, and natural gas infrastructure
systems by taking into account their synergies. We formu-
late the problem as a two-player noncooperative zero-sum
game between the owner of the interdependent gas-power-
water infrastructure, acting as defender, and an adversary.
In this game, the defender needs to allocate communication
resources across the different subsystems of the interconnected
infrastructure for monitoring purposes which in turn lead
to improved detection and enabling of protective actions.
Meanwhile, the attacker seeks to disrupt and deviate the entire
system from its operational state by simultaneously choosing
a set of entities over which it will initiate state attacks. One
key property of this game is that it allows identification of
the behavior of the defender and attacker in presence of inter-
dependent infrastructure. We show how the interconnectivity
between critical infrastructure can exacerbate security risks,
even though it achieves better performance and operational
quality. Numerical results show how an adversary can benefit
from this interdependence to induce damage on the power
system by launching an attack on components of the water
or gas systems. The results also show that a game-theoretic
approach for communication resource allocation yields better
control on the system operation under attack, compared to an
equal allocation of resources.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the state space model for the interdependent critical
infrastructure. In Section III, the attack model is presented.
Section IV presents system monitors which are guaranteed to
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detect state attacks. In Section V, the proposed game-theoretic
framework is presented. Simulation results are analyzed in
Section VI while conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a smart city that encompasses various intercon-
nected CPSs, namely, electric, natural gas, and water distri-
bution systems whose interdependence and synergy enable a
smart and sustainable operation of the entire city. To formally
define such infrastructure, next, we introduce a mathematical
state space representation which captures their interdepen-
dence. This proposed analytical framework enables an accurate
understanding of the dynamic operation of the considered
critical infrastructure which allows analysis of their security.
A. Electric Power Systems
The electric power system is composed of generators and
loads interconnected via transmission lines and substations.
The dynamics of a generator are dependent on the input
mechanical power received from burning fuel (such as natural
gas or coal) or flowing wind or water, and on the output
power which it must supply to meet the city’s demand. Hence,
considering static frequency-dependent loads at the time-scale
of our analysis, we can model the power system dynamics
following the linear swing model [12]:I 0 00 M 0
0 0 0
 δ˙ω˙
θ˙
=−
 0 −I 0Lgg D Lgl
Llg 0 Lll
δω
θ
+
 0P g
P l
 , (1)
where δ and ω are, respectively, the vectors of rotors’ phase
angles (i.e. angular displacement) and angular speeds which
constitute the state variables of the electric system. Lgg , Lgl,
Llg, and Lll are the susceptance matrices of the system where
subscripts l and g stand for generator and load, respectively,
M and D are diagonal matrices representing, respectively,
the generators’ inertia constants and damping coefficients,
while P g and P l are the vectors of net power injected at
the generator and load buses, respectively.
B. Natural Gas and Water Systems
The natural gas distribution system is composed of various
interconnected components including supply units, storage
units, pipelines, compressors, and loads. Natural gas is sup-
plied from gas wells, commonly located at remote sites [13]
and which can be modeled as positive injections to the natural
gas system with constant head pressures. In addition to gas
wells, natural gas storage units are distributed in the network
to provide gas to the system during times of high demand and
receive gas from the system when demand is low. Thus, the
head pressure of the storage units can be modeled as:
Rrh˙r =
∑
j∈N inr
Qjs −
∑
k∈N outs
Qri, (2)
where hr is the head pressure of the storage junction, Qjr is
the flow between junctions j and junction r, N inr and N outr
are the set of junctions which have positive or negative flow
to junction r, respectively, and Rr is the charging ratio of the
corresponding gas tank.
The flow in a pipeline depends on the pressure drop along
the pipe [13] and is modeled as:
Qij = sgn(hi, hj)Cij
√
|h2i − h2j |, (3)
where sgn(hi, hj) = 1 if hi ≥ hj and sgn(hi, hj) = −1 if
hi < hj , and Cij is a pipeline constant which depends on
the physical characteristics of the pipeline, the environment,
and the gas composition. The pressure loss in pipelines can
be compensated by compressors. In this respect, the flow in
the gas pipeline can then be represented as follows:
Qij = sgn(hi, hj)
Pc
k2 − k1
[
max(hi,hj)
min(hi,hj)
]α , (4)
where Pc is the power demand of the compressor, while k1,
k2, and α are design parameters of the compressor [13].
Loads: In natural gas systems, the demand junctions are
typically modeled as follows [13]:
di =
∑
j∈N ini
Qji −
∑
k∈N outi
Qik, (5)
where di is the static demand at junction i.
By using an analogy to the gas system, we can model flow
equation in the water network as follows [6]:
Qij = sgn(hi, hj)Cij|hi − hj | 11.85 . (6)
Also, treatment plants for purification and pressure control
inside the water system require electric power and they make
the water system dependent on the electric system [14].
C. Interconnected Critical Infrastructure Model
Various components in the gas, power, and water systems
can be largely interdependent. For instance, many generators
can be supplied by natural gas and most generators can use
water at different steps of power generation such as from steam
condensation and temperature control [15]. These large water
and gas requirements imply that the generators will constitute
demand junctions in the water and gas systems. In our model,
we categorize the generators into two groups: a) a first group
in which generators are supplied by natural gas and the
mechanical input power, Pl, of these generators is proportional
to the input natural gas, di, and b) a second group of generators
that are nuclear, coal supplied, or wind turbines. Additionally,
the power generated at all generators is proportional to the
input water. Furthermore, the water treatment plants and gas
compressors constitute one of the major loads of the power
system. Therefore, the interdependence of the power system
on water and natural gas systems can be captured as follows:
[
P g
P l
]
=
[
C ′G C ′W
] 
hGS
hGJ
hWS
hWJ
 , (7)
where hGs is the vector of the head pressure of the gas
storage units having nGs elements, h
W
s is the vector of the
head pressure of the water storage units having nWs elements,
hGj is the vector of the head pressure at the gas junctions
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
, (8)
having nGj elements, and h
W
j is the vector of head pressure at
the water junctions having nWj elements. The characteristics
of pipelines, treatment centers, and compressors are captured
in the (nGg + ng + nc + nt) × (nGs + nGj ) matrix C
′G and
(nGg +ng +nc +nt)× (nWs +nWj ) matrix C
′W , respectively.
By modifying the rows and columns of C
′G and C
′W , we
can substitute (7) into (1) and derive a general differential al-
gebraic state space model for the interconnected infrastructure
as in (8). In (8), δ is the nGg + ng × 1 vector of generator
phase angles, ωG is the nGg × 1 vector of angular speeds of
generators running on natural gas, ω is the ng × 1 vector of
angular speeds of generators running on resources other than
natural gas, θc is the nc× 1 vector of voltage phase angles at
buses supplying power to gas compressors, θt is the nt × 1
vector of voltage phase angles at buses supplying power to
water treatment plants, θ is the nl×1 vector of voltage phase
angles at other types of buses, hGs is the n
G
s × 1 vector of
the head pressure of the gas storage units, hWs is the n
W
s × 1
vector of the head pressure of the water storage units, hGj is
the nGj × 1 vector of head pressure at the junctions in the gas
network, and hWj is the vector of the n
W
j ×1 head pressure at
the junctions of the water system. Here, all the vectors capture
the states of the interconnected system. The dependence of the
electric system on natural gas and water systems is captured by
matrices CG and CW , respectively. I and O are, respectively,
the identity matrix and zero matrix with proper dimensions.
Equation (8) can be rewritten as follows:
Ex˙ = Ax, (9)
where x ∈ Rn is the state vector, A ∈ Rn×n, and the diagonal
matrix E ∈ Rn×n is a constant matrix that reflects the system
characteristics. In addition, in CPSs, a set of sensors are spread
around the system to collect measurements and report them to
the administrator of the interdependent system. We assume
the owners of all three infrastructure as a single administrator
since they work together to control their infrastructure. The
sensor outputs are related to the system states following the
output equation:
y = Cx, (10)
where y ∈ Rp represents the sensor data vector and C ∈ Rp×n
is known as the output matrix. This large-scale interdepen-
dence among the dynamic states of the electric, water, and
natural gas systems makes the resulting critical infrastructure
vulnerable to state attacks as explained next.
III. ATTACK MODEL
State attacks on the considered critical interdependent gas-
power-water infrastructure can be modeled as an additive
attack to the descriptor system in (8). Such attacks will lead
to deviations in the states and sensor outputs. The dynamic
system under state attack will then be given by [6]:
E ˙˜x = Ax˜+ bv,
y˜ = Cx˜,
(11)
where x˜ ∈ Rn and y˜ ∈ Rp are the state variables of the system
state and measurements in the presence of a state attack. v ∈ R
is the state attack value, b ∈ Rn is a vector containing n
elements only K of which are nonzero having a value equal
to 1. These nonzero elements correspond to the states selected
by the attacker to initiate a state attack. We define κ to be
the set of indices of the nonzero elements of vector b. In this
regard, to capture the effect of the attack on the state variables,
we apply the Laplace transform to the difference between (9)
and (11), which yields:
(sE −A) ∆x(s) = bv(s), (12)
where ∆x(s) is the vector of state deviation, in the Laplace
domain, in the presence of an attack. (12) is a system of n
equations, therefore, assuming that our system is originally
stable (under no attack), sE − A can be considered to
be invertible and, then, the solution of system (12) can be
obtained using Cramer’s rule as follows:
∆xi(s) =
|(sE −A)i,v(s)|
|sE −A| , (13)
where |sE − A| is the determinant of matrix sE − A and
|(sE −A)i,v(s)| is the determinant of matrix sE −A when
its i-th column is replaced by bv(s). The numerator of the
fraction in (13) can be written as:
|(sE −A)i,v(s)| =
∑
j∈κ
(−1)i+j |(sE −A)i¯,j¯ |vj(s), (14)
where |(sE − A)i¯,j¯ | is the determinant of matrix sE − A
excluding its i-th column and j-th row. Hence, we can simplify
(13) as follows:
∆xi(s) =
∑
j∈κ
(−1)i+j |(sE −A)i¯,j¯ ||sE −A| vj(s). (15)
As such, we can quantify the deviation that is caused by the
attacker on any system state i in the time domain as follows:
∆xi(t) =
∑
j∈κ
(−1)i+jL −1
{ |(sE −A)i¯,j¯ |
|sE −A| vj(s)
}
, (16)
where L −1{} is the Laplacian inverse transform. Here, we
assume that the cost of power generation can be expressed as a
function of the system states [16] – linearized around a certain
operating state, using a first order Taylor series approximation
– and, hence, the cost deviation will be given by:
∆p =
∑
i∈Ne
cpi |∆xi|, (17)
where ∆p is the deviation in the real-time power generation
cost, Ne is the set of states inside the power system, and cpi
is the portion of the effect of the deviation of state i on the
cost, which is derived from linearization. Finally, the variation
of power generation cost that is caused by the attack vector
bv for a duration of ta seconds can be written as follows:
∆p(ta, κ) =
∫ ta
0
∑
i∈Ne
cpi×∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈κ
(−1)i+jL −1
{ |(sE −A)i¯,j¯ |
|sE −A| vj(s)
}∣∣∣∣∣∣ dt.
(18)
We assume that the attacker can benefit from the deviation in
the real-time cost of electric power generation and, therefore,
seeks to maximize (18) by initiating attacks on a properly
selected set of states. In response, the defender can decrease
the deviation in the cost by reducing the available time for the
attacker to stay undetectable in the system.
IV. ATTACK DETECTION
Consider the descriptor system (11) for a known initial
system state x(0). In this case, an attack detection filter that
is guaranteed to detect the presence of attacks [6] will be:
Ez˙ = (A+GC)z −Gy,
r = Cz − y, (19)
where z(0) = x(0) and block diagonal matrix G ∈ Rn×p is
such that the pair (E,A+GC) is regular and Hurwitz. Then
r(t) = 0 at all times t ∈ R≥0 if and only if bv = 0 at all times
t ∈ R≥0 and, in the absence of attacks, the filter error z−x is
exponentially stable [6]. To implement this approach, we need
N disjoint subsystems of the system (11) with ni state variables
in each subsystem i. Here, E and C are block-diagonal. To
capture these subsystems, we can write the matrix A:
A =
 A1 · · · A1N... ... ...
AN1 · · · AN
 = AD +AC , (20)
where Ai ∈ Rni×ni , Aij ∈ Rni×nj , AD is a block-diagonal
matrix, whose diagonal contains (A1, · · · ,AN ), and AC is
designed such that A = AD +AC . Given a potential attack
on each subsystem, we can write the dynamic representation
of a subsystem i:
Eix˙i = Aixi +
∑
j∈N ini
Aijxj , (21)
yi = Cixi, for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (22)
where xi and yi are the state variables and sensor mea-
surements of subsystem i and N ini is the set of subsystems
that depend on subsystem i. As such, the distributed attack
detection filter can be expressed as [6]:
Ez˙(t) = (AD +GC) z(t) +ACz(t)−Gy(t),
r(t) = y(t)−Cz(t). (23)
In (23), since matrices AD, C, and G are block diagonal,
each subsystem must receive ACw(t) from the connected
subsystems to be able to compute the residue of the filter,
continuously. To reduce the load and overhead that can result
from a continuous communication between subsystems, we
use the waveform relaxation approach in [6]. In this approach,
to observe the existence of an attack during a time interval
[0, T ] where T > 0, each subsystem i transmit its own
states zi(t) to the subsystems in N outi (the set of subsystems
on which subsystem i is dependent) and will receive states
zj from subsystems in N ini . Then, the waveform relaxation
iteration for distributed filter can be written as follows:
Eiz˙
(k)
i (t) =
(Ai +GiCi)z
(k)
i (t) +
∑
j∈N ini
Aijz
(k−1)
j (t)−Giyi. (24)
Each subsystem has an initial estimation z(0)j (t) for the
connected subsystems and using the following steps, it can
find the local residue of filter (23) starting from step k = 0:
1) Increment k by one and compute z(k)i (t) from filter (24).
2) Transmit z(k)i (t) to the subsystem j ∈ N outi ,
3) Receive z(k)j (t) from subsystems j ∈ N ini and update
w
(k)
j ,
The residue in local filters for sufficiently large k = k¯ converge
and can be used for local attack detection [6].
The main shortcoming of this method is that each subsystem
should wait for T seconds before starting to calculate the
residue of its filter. This will make the system vulnerable to
attacks for T seconds. To overcome this challenge, we next
propose a game-theoretic approach.
V. GAME-THEORETIC ATTACK DETECTION
A. Communication Limitation in Attack Detection
The presented distributed detection filter in Section IV does
not account for the potential limitation on the communication
capacity. This limitation bounds the needed communication of
data between the subsystems for the distributed computation
of the residues. In addition, the presented detection filter does
not prioritize between the different subsystems based on their
induced effect on the operation of the whole system or their
level of vulnerability to attacks. The designer of the attack
detection filters who is the administrator of the system, can
reduce the time needed to detect an attack on a certain state
by having more frequent communications between the subsys-
tems. However, the limitations in communication resources
such as bandwidth or processing power and the associated
overhead prevents the defender from infinitely increasing the
rate of communication among the subsystems to decrease the
detection time to zero. In this regard, we consider that the
total number of successful connections that the communication
layer can provide is M per second. As such, we assume that
the number of connections during T seconds for a subsystem
i is mi. Here, the total number of connections cannot exceed
M as captured by:
N∑
i=1
mi ≤ TM. (25)
In this respect, increasing the number of connections allo-
cated to a certain subsystem can reduce the time over which
this subsystem can be subject to an attack before attack detec-
tion. To this end, the defender can use a strategy which consists
of assigning a time division mi to each of the N subsystems to
decrease the potential damage inflicted by the attacker. Indeed,
allocating mi connections to a subsystem i allows the attacker
to stay undetected for T/mi seconds while attacking the states
of i, therefore, the defender can choose a higher value for
mi for the subsystems with higher vulnerabilities to the state
attacks to reduce the detection delay on those subsystems.
ConsideringM as the set of possible communication resource
allocations between the different subsystems, we can rewrite
(18) as follows:
∆p(κ, µ) =
∑
j∈κ
∫ T
mj
0
L −1
{(
n∑
i=1
(−1)i+jcpi×
|(sE −A)i¯,j¯ |
|sE −A|
)
vj(s)
}
dt,
(26)
where µ = {m1, . . . ,mN} ∈ M. (26) represents the devi-
ations in the operational states of the system (i.e. electricity
costs) achieved by the attacker by choosing the attack set κ
while the set of allocated communication resources by the
defender is µ. Since the attacker aims to increase the cost
deviation by selecting proper states to attack and the defender
seeks to reduce the deviation by optimal allocation of the
communication resources on the subsystems, we can use a
game-theoretic approach to solve this problem [17].
B. Game Formulation and Solution
To model the interdependent decision making process of the
attacker and defender, we introduce a zero-sum noncooperative
game in strategic form
{Q, {Si}i∈Q , {ui}i∈Q} defined by
three components: a) the players which are the attacker a and
defender d in the set Q := {a, d}, b) the strategy spaces Si
for i ∈ Q, and c) the utility function ui of each player.
For the attacker, the set of strategies Sa correspond to the
set of states to attack simultaneously among the different states
of the interconnected infrastructure. Hence, Sa is defined as:
Sa , K =
κ∣∣κ =
bj ∈ {0, 1}
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
j=1
bj ≤ K

 , (27)
where K is the number of states that the attacker can attack
simultaneously and n is the number of states of the entire
interdependent system. For the defender, given the limitation
on the traffic load, it can assign different observation periods
for each subsystem by assigning mi to each subsystem while
meeting the constraint in (25). Therefore, the strategy set of
the defender consists of the different possible allocations of
the communication resources among the subsystems:
Sd,M =
{
µ
∣∣µ ={mi ∈{1, . . . , TM}
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
mi≤TM
}}
. (28)
For a chosen attack strategy κ ∈ Sa and µ ∈ Sd, the utility
function of the attacker and defender corresponds to:
ua(κ, µ) = −ud(κ, µ) = ∆p(κ, µ). (29)
C. Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Solution
For the studied attack detection game, players can choose
one of the strategies in their strategy set or assign probabilities
for playing each of the strategies which is called the mixed
strategy [17]. Mixed strategies are motivated by two facts: a)
both players must randomize over their strategies in order to
make it nontrivial for the opponent to guess their potential
actions, and b) the communication resource allocation and
state attacks can be repeated over an infinite time duration,
and therefore mixed strategies can capture the frequency of
choosing certain strategies for both players. Let pa be the
vector of mixed strategies for the attacker where each element
in pa is the probability of selecting a set of states κ ∈ Sa to
attack simultaneously and pd be the vector of mixed strategies
for the defender whose elements represent the probability of
allocating a certain amount of resources on the subsystems as
captured by µ ∈ Sd.
In a game-theoretic setting [17], each player chooses its
own mixed-strategy vector to maximize its expected utility.
The utility of each player is the expected value over its mixed
strategies, which for any of the two players i ∈ Q, is:
Ui(pa,pd) =
∑
s∈S
(pd (µ) pa (κ))ui(s), (30)
where s = [µ κ] is a vector of selected pure strategies and
S = Sa × Sd. In our game, the defender seeks to minimize
(30) while the attacker seeks to maximize it.
To solve the proposed game, we seek to find the mixed-Nash
equilibrium, defined as follows:
Definition 1. A mixed strategy profile p∗ constitutes a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium if for the defender, d, and attacker,
a, we have:
Ud(p
∗
d,p
∗
a) ≤ Ud(pd,p∗a), ∀pd ∈ Pd,
Ua(p
∗
d,p
∗
a) ≥ Ua(p∗d,pa), ∀pa ∈ Pa,
(31)
where Pi is the set of all probability distributions for player
i over its action space Si.
It is well-known that there exists at least one mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium (MSNE) for any finite noncooperative game
[17]. The MSNE for our game implies a state at which
the defender has chosen its optimal randomization over the
resource allocations and, therefore, cannot improve its utility
by changing this allocation. Similarly, for the attacker, an
MSNE for attacker represents a state at which the attacker
has chosen its optimal randomization over the selection of
states to initiate an attack and, thus, cannot improve its utility
by changing this choice. Since our game is a zero-sum two-
Fig. 1: Example of interconnected infrastructure: the blue,
orange, and brown elements are the components of the
water, electric and natural gas system.
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Fig. 2: Percentage of deviation from power generation cost
resulting from the attack on the states of the gas and water
system. Attacks initiated at t = 1s and lasted until t = 4s.
player, to find a closed-form solution for the MSNE, we can
use the von Neumann indifference principle [17]. Under this
principle, the expected utilities of players at MSNE for of
any pure choice under the mixed strategies played by the
opponent, must be equal. Given the large strategy space for
the players in our game, solving the equations derived from
von Neuman approach can be challenging, thereby, we use a
learning algorithm named fictitious play [18], which is known
to converge to an MSNE for any two-player zero-sum game.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we simulate a system of interconnected
critical infrastructure having two electric subsystems, two
water subsystems, and two natural gas subsystems consisting
of four generators, two tanks, and two gas storage units,
respectively, as shown in Fig. 1. In this model, we have 8
electric system states (4 generator phase angle and 4 angular
speed), 2 water system states and 2 natural gas states. There-
fore, 12 states in the interconnected system can be attacked
by the attacker. The physical parameters of the system are
chosen such that (8) is asymptotically stable. We observe the
system for 5 seconds during which the defender can allocate
communication resources over 6 subsystems. For the proposed
game, we assume that the highest number of the states that
the attacker can choose is 5 and we simulate the system for
different numbers of available communication resources for
the defender. To obtain the MSNE under different conditions,
we use the algorithm proposed in [18].
We simulated the attacks on the states of the natural gas
and water systems during the time interval of [1, 4] seconds
without any resource allocation on the subsystems to show the
deviation in power cost caused by attacking to the natural gas
and water systems. Fig. 2 shows that the dependence of the
power system on water and natural gas provides an opportunity
for the attacker to change the power cost by attacking the water
and natural gas systems. From Fig. 2 we can see that, when the
attacker initiates an attack on one of the states of the water or
natural gas system at t = 1s the power generation cost starts
to deviate and the deviation lasts until the attacker stops the
state attack at t = 4s.
In Fig. 3, we show the expected cost deviation as a function
of available communication resources. Fig. 3 illustrates that,
the expected utility for the attacker decreases by 36% with
40% increase in the communication resources when both the
defender and attacker play their MSNE. To show the benefits
of using a game-theoretic solution, we compare with the case
in which the defender equally allocates the communication
resources on the subsystems without strategic behavior, while,
attacker: 1) plays the MSNE obtained from the previous
simulation or 2) plays the pure strategy which maximizes its
expected utility, i.e., the best response. Fig. 3 shows that the
expected deviation of the cost when the defender allocates
resources equally over the subsystems, is 35% higher than
when the defender plays the MSNE. This illustrates that using
the proposed game-theoretic solution, the defender can reduce
the expected cost deviation. In addition, Fig. 3 shows that,
while the defender equally allocates the resources, attacker can
increase the cost deviation by 18% if it chooses to play the
best response instead of MSNE. Under equal allocation, since
the defender allocates the resources without considering the
attacker’s strategy, the attacker does not randomize between
the strategies and chooses the strategy which maximizes its
utility and, therefore, the best response of the attacker to equal
allocation of resources yields a higher utility for the attacker.
In Fig. 4, we compare two cases: a) a first case in which
the defender only protects the electric system, b) a second
case in which the defender protects all the interdependent
systems. From Fig. 4, we can see that, if the defender al-
locates the resources only on the electric system, the expected
cost deviation increases by 30%, approximately. From the
attacker’s perspective, the attacker can increase the expected
cost deviation by 35% if it is able to attack the states of
the natural gas and water systems compared to the case in
which the attacker attacks only the states of the power system.
Therefore, we can conclude that the interdependence between
the electric, natural gas, and water systems can potentially
increase the system’s vulnerability to attacks.
Finally, to provide further insight on the allocation of
communication resources and selection of states to attack,
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Fig. 4: Comparison of the expected cost considering
interdependent and disjoint systems.
we consider a scenario in which the available communication
resources for the defender are equal to M = 1200 and the
attacker can attack up to K = 5 states. The MSNE for the at-
tacker in this case is mixing between {δ11 , ω22 , hGs1 , hGs2 , hWs2 , }
and {δ11 , δ12 , ω21 , hGs1 , hGs2 , } with the probability vector pa =
[0.872, 0.128] while the defender allocates the resources to
6 subsystems as {m1 = 300,m2 = 400,m3 = 100,m4 =
200,m5 = 100,m6 = 100} and {m1 = 300,m2 =
300,m3 = 200,m4 = 200,m5 = 100,m6 = 100} with the
probability vector pd = [0.0183, 0.9817] in its MSNE. From
this result, it is clear that, at the MSNE, the attacker tends to
attack to some of the water and natural gas states and, also,
the defender allocates some of its communication resources to
the water and gas subsystems to prevent the deviations in the
power generation cost.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel game-theoretic ap-
proach for modeling the interactions between the administrator
of an infrastructure and an adversary. The administrator seeks
to observe the operation of the system by allocating communi-
cation resources over the local subsystems of its infrastructure.
Meanwhile, the adversary seeks to attack the states of the
infrastructure to disrupt the system’s nominal operation. We
have formulated the problem as a noncooperative zero-sum
game where the defender allocates limited communication
resources among the subsystems of the interdependent system
while the attacker tries to optimally select the states to attack.
Our results have shown that the interdependence between
electric, water, and gas systems makes the electric system
vulnerable to state attacks in the natural gas and water system.
To overcome this vulnerability, the defender needs to allocate
some of the available communication resources to the natural
gas and water infrastructure.
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